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[40 C.2d

Jan. 6, 1953.]

MERCEI~-

FRASER COMPANY (a Corporation), Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION
and DAWN rriiALIA SODEN, Respondents.
[Sac. No. 6239.

In Bank.

Jan. 6, 1953.]

MERCER- FRASER COMPANY (a Corporation), Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION
and MAUDE MAY EPPING, Respondents.
[Sac. No. 6240.

In Bank.

Jan. 6, 1953.]

MERCER- FRASER COMPANY (a Corporation), Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION
and JOHN F. WALSH, Respondents.
[Sac. No. 6241.

In Bank.

Jan. 6, 1953.]

MERCER- FRASER COMPANY (a Corporation), Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION
and JAMES A. McNABB, Respondents.
[1] Workmen's Compensation- Compensable Injuries- Wilful
Misconduct.-Lab. Code, § 4553, authorizing awards of increased benefits in industrial accident cases if employes were
"injured by reason of serious and wilful misconduct" of the
employer, does not make the employer an insurer of safety
and does not authorize an additional award on a showing
of mere negligence, or even of gross negligence.
[2] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Wilful Misconduct.-Under Lab.
Code, § 4553, awards of increased benefits can be sustained
only if the employer's misconduct was both serious and wilful, and where the employer is a corporation, such miscon[1] Serious and wilful misconduct of employer warranting increased compensation, or action at law, notes, 16 A.L.R. 620; 58
A.L.R. 1379. See, also, Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 118;
Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 54.
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Workmen's Compensation, § 123;
[ 5, 6] Workmen's Compensation, § 118; [7] Workmen's Compensation, §151; [8] Negligence, §3; [9-13] Negligence, §8; [14]
Negligence, §§7, 8; [15,16] Workmen's Compensation, §124;
[17] Workmen's Compensation, § 180; [18-24] Workmen's Compensation,§ 190; [25] Workmen's Compensation, § 264; [26] Certiorari, § 62.
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duct must be "on the part of an executive, managing officer,
or general superintendent" of such corporation.
[3] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Wilful Misconduct.-Imposition
of the increased award under Lab. Code, § 4553, on evidence
showing, or a finding of, conduct any less culpable than that
specified by the statute would constitute an unlawful taking
of the property of one person and an unwarranted giving
of it to another.
[4] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Wilful Misconduct.-An award
under Lab. Code, § 4553, although denominated and regarded
for some purposes as "increased compensation," is actually
of the nature of a penalty, and cannot be insured against.
(Ins. Code, § 11661.)
[5] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Misconduct by Employe.-The
words "serious and wilful misconduct" as used in Lab. Code,
§ 4551, authorizing reduction of compensation otherwise recoverable where injury is caused by serious and wilful misconduct of the injured employe, must be given the same
meaning as they have in § 4553, there being no difference in
principle between the degree of care required of an employer
and that exacted from an employe in determining whether
serious and wilful misconduct occurred.
[6] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Misconduct of Managing Superintendent.-In determining whether the managing superintendent of a corporate employer was guilty of serious and
wilful misconduct which would justify increasing the award
for other injured employes, a reviewing court must also consider that such misconduct, if the same accident injured the
superintendent, would require reducing the normal award to
him.
[7] Id.- Questions of Law and Fact- Wilful Misconduct.Whether in any given case serious and wilful misconduct is
shown, inherently presents questions of both fact and law;
insofar as the issues may relate to the credibility of witnesses, the persuasiveness or weight of the evidence and the
resolving of conflicting inferences, the questions are of fact,
but as to what minimum factual elements must be proven
to constitute serious and wilful misconduct, and sufficiency
of the evidence to that end, the questions are of law.
[8] Negligence-Definition.-Negligence is an unintentional tort,
a failure to exercise the degree of care in a given situation
that a reasonable man under similar circumstances would
exercise to protect others from harm.
[9] Id.-"Wilfulness."-A negligent person has no desire to cause
the harm that results from his carelessness, as distinguished
[8] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 4; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 2.
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from a person guilty of wilful misconduct who intends to
cause harm, wilfulness and negligence being contradictory
terms.
[10] Id.-"Wilfulness" and "Wantonness."-A tort having some
of the characteristics of both negligence and wilfulness occurs
when a person, with no intent to eause harm, intentionally
performs an act so unreasonable and dangerous that he knows,
or should know, that it is highly probable that harm will result; such a tort is wanton and reckless misconduct, although
it is sometimes called "wilful negligence," "wanton and wilful negligence," "wanton and wilful misconduct," and even
"gross negligence."
[11] Id.-"Wilfulness" and "Wantonness."-Wanton and reckless
misconduct involves no intention, as does wilful misconduct,
to do harm, and it differs from negligence in that it does
involve an intention to perform an act which the actor knows,
or should know, will very probably cause harm.
[12] Id.-Wilful Misconduct.-Wilful misconduct necessarily involves deliberate, intentional or wanton conduct in doing or
omitting to perform acts, with knowledge or appreciation
of the fact, on the culpable person's part, that danger is
likely to result therefrom.
[13] Id.- Wilful Misconduct.- To constitute wilful misconduct
there must be actual knowledge, or that which is the equivalent of actual knowledge, of the peril to be apprehended
from the failure to act, coupled with a conscious failure to
act to the end of averting injury; a mere failure to perform
a statutory duty is not, alone, wilful misconduct.
[14] Id.- Gross Negligence: Wilful Misconduct.- Gross negligence is merely such a Jack of care as may be presumed to
indicate a passive and indifferent attitude toward results,
while wilful misconduct involves a more positive intent actually to harm another or to do an act with a positive, active
and absolute disregard of its consequences.
[15] Workmen's Compensation- Compensable Injuries- Wilful
Misconduct.-"Serious and wilful misconduct" cannot be established by showing acts any less culpable, any less deliberate, or any less knowing or intentional, than is required
to prove wilful misconduct.
[16] Id.- Compensable Injuries- Wilful Misconduct. - Serious
and wilful misconduct is basically the antithesis of negligence, and the two types of behavior are mutually exclusive;
an act which is merely negligent and consequently devoid of
either an intention to do harm or of knowledge or apprt>ciation of the fact that danger is likely to result therefrom cannot at the same time constitute wilful misconduct, and conversely an act deliberately done for the express purpose of
injuring another, or intentionally performed either with know I-
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edge that serious injury is a probable result or with a positive, active, wanton, reckless and absolute disregard of its
possibly damaging consequences, cannot properly be classed
as negligence.
[17] !d.-Evidence-Wilful Misconduct.-A finding of serious and
wilful misconduct cannot be sustained on proof of mere negligence of any degree.
[18a-18c] !d.-Findings-Wilful Misconduct.-A finding of the
Industrial Accident Commission that a corporate employer,
through its general superintendent, knowingly and wilfully
failed to "furnish employment and a place of employment,
which was a safe place for the work," and so was guilty of
serious and wilful misconduct, is insufficient since it does
not determine that such employer was guilty of more than
negligence, improperly holds it to the standard of an insurer,
and, when considered with circumstances indicating that the
commission was of the view that the superintendent believed
that the method of construction being employed in the building in question was sound and sufficient for the safety of all
concerned, imputes that he was guilty of no more than a
mistake in judgment.
[19a-19c] !d.-Findings-Wilful Misconduct.-Findings of Industrial Accident Commission that a corporate employer, through
its general superintendent, knowingly and wilfully failed
properly and adequately to brace and guy the prefabricated
parts of a building being erected "so as to prevent" the fall
or collapse thereof during construction, indicate that the
commission was holding such employer to the standard of
an insurer or guarantor of the safety of its employes rather
than applying the legally essential elements to the issue of
serious and wilful misconduct.
[20a, 20b] !d.-Findings-Wilful Misconduct.-Findings of the
Industrial Accident Commission that a corporate employer,
through its general superintendent knowingly and wilfully
failed to "exercise that degree of prudence, foresight and
caution which, under the circumstances, a prudent employer
would then and there have" exercised "had it turned its
mind to the fact" do not establish serious and wilful misconduct, but only negligence.
[21a, 21b] !d.-Findings-Wilful Misconduct.-A finding of the
Industrial Accident Commission that a corporate employer,
through its general superintendent, knowingly and wilfully
failed to comply with the requirements of Lab. Code, §§ 64006403, neglecting and omitting to provide necessary and adequate bracing and guying of the prefabricated parts of a
building under construction "so as to prevent" its fall or
collapse during construction, is insufficient to show serious
and wilful misconduct since it presupposes that failure for
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any reason to install and maintain such guying and bracing
as would absolutely "prevent" the fall or collapse of the
structure, would amount to a violation of the listed sections
and would constitute serious and wilful misconduct.
[22] Id.-Findings.-The primary rule of construing findings of
the Industrial Accident Commission is to interpret them liberally in sustaining an award, and even if a finding, by itself,
is inadequate for uncertainty it will still be upheld if it can
be made certain by reference to the record.
[23a, 23b] Id.-Findings.-Although it is not required that findings of the Industrial Accident Commission be specific and detailed, it is essential that they be sufficient in form and substance so that by reading them and referring to the record
the parties and a reviewing court can tell with reasonable
certainty not only the theory on which the commission has
arrived at its ultimate finding and conclusion, but that the
commission has found those facts which are essential to sustain its award.
[24] !d.-Findings-Wilful Misconduct.-Findings of the Industrial Accident Commission which state the ultimate conclusion
of serious and wilful misconduct of a corporate employer are
insufficient where they do not specify any facts from which
a reviewing court can conclude that the basic and essential
factual elements, which are necessary to support the ultimate conclusion of serious and wilful misconduct, were found
to exist, and where such findings indicate that the commission
was holding such employer to the standard of an insurer or
guarantor of the safety of its employes.
[25] !d.-Certiorari-Petition-Service.-Where petitions by a
corporate employer to review awards of the Industrial Accident Commission for increased benefits under Lab. Code,
§ 4553, were accompanied by proof of service of copies thereof
on the commission as required by rule 57 of the Rules on
Appeal as it read on the date the petitions were filed, failure
of petitioner to serve copies of the petition on the individual
respondents either prior to filing such petitions or within
the 30-day period specified by Lab. Code, § 5950, during
which the petitions may be filed, does not preclude a consideration of the petitions by the reviewing court in the
absence of any time limitations set forth in Lab. Code, § 5954,
requiring that such a petition be served on the commission
and on every party who entered an appearance in the proceeding before the commission and whose interest therein is
adverse to the party filing the petition.
[26] Certiorari-Petition-Service.-Requirements as to service of
a petition for certiorari in Code Civ. Proc., § 1107, are more
directory than mandatory as the court may act on the petition without any service if it decides to do so.
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PROCEEDINGS to review orders of the Industrial Accident Commission awarding increased compensation for asserted
serious and wilful misconduct. Awards annulled.
Gardiner Johnson, Roy D. Reese and Samuel C. Shenk
for Petitioner.
Edmund J. Thomas, Jr., T. Groezinger, P. H. McCarthy,
Jr., F. Nason O'Hara, Herbert S. Johnson and Alfred C.
Skaife for Respondents.
SCHAUER, J.-In these four consolidated matters petitioner corporation seeks review of awards, made by the Industrial Accident Commission, of increased benefits assessed
against it under the provisions of section 4553 of the Labor
Code, 1 upon the theory that it was guilty of serious and wilful
misconduct. 2 We have concluded that although we assume
the sufficiency of the evidence to support findings which would
sustain awards upon the issue of serious and wilful misconduct, petitioner is correct in its contention that the findings
made by the commission do not support the awards, in that
they disclose that such awards are based upon an erroneous
aud untenable concept of the law. We conclude further that
the individual respondents' objections to the jurisdiction of
this court to entertain these proceedings on their merits cannot be sustained, and that the awards should be annulled.
In June, 1948, four employes of petitioner were injured,
two of them (Soden and Epping) fatally, when the prefabricated parts of a building being constructed by the employer collapsed and fell while the employes were working
thereon. The record shows that the commission made a conclusional finding that the employer was guilty of serious
and wilful misconduct and that this conclusion is based on
various primary findings, including a finding that the employer's general superintendent knowingly and wilfully failed
and neglected to properly and adequately brace and guy the
prefabricated parts of the building being erected, ''so as to
prevent'' the fall or collapse thereof during the construction.
The record also discloses, as will subsequently be shown in
some detail, that the commission was of the view that the peti1
Unless otherwise stated, all section citations refer to sections of the
Labor Code.
2
A wards for normal compensation were made in other and prior
proceedings before the commission, and are not here involved or before us.
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tioner was bound under an absolute duty to preserve the
safety of the employes, at least to the extent that it was
humanly possible to foresee and guard against danger, and
that any failure to maintain such standard of safety, whether
negligent or otherwise, constituted serious and wilful misconduct.
Petitioner urges that the awards are unreasonable and
arbitrary and are not supported by the findings, that the
findings are not supported by the evidence, and more particularly that the commission has by the findings and awards
unlawfully imposed upon petitioner a responsibility to insure
(i.e., preserve absolutely) the safety of its employes or be
subject to the increased assessment under section 4553.
[1] It must be recognized at the outset that the statute
in question does not make the employer an insurer of safety
and that it does not authorize the additional award upon a
showing of mere negligence, or even of gross negligence.
[2] Under the provisions of section 4553 the awards of increased benefits can be sustained only if the employes were "injured by reason of the serious and wilful misconduct" (italics
added) of the employer, and where, as here, the employer is
a corporation, such misconduct must be ''on the part of an
executive, managing officer, or general superintendent" of
the employer corporation. (See California Shipbuilding Corp.
v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1947), 31 Cal.2d 278, 279 [188 P.2d
32].) [3] Imposition. of the increased award upon evidence showing (or a finding of) conduct any less culpable
than that specified by the statute would constitute an unlawful taking of the property of one person and an unwarranted
giving of it to another. [4] An award of the type here
involved, although denominated and regarded for some purposes as "increased compensation," is actually of the nature
of a penalty (Campbell, "'Workmen's Compensation," § 423,
p. 381; cf. E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com.
(1920), 184 Cal. 180, 192 [193 P. 105, 16 A.L.R. 611]), and
cannot be insured against (Ins. Code, § 116613 ). Such an
award, therefore, can be sustained only if the evidence establishes and the commission finds, directly or impliedly, every
fact essential to its imposition.
Since in interpreting the law (specifically, the meaning of
the words "serious and wilful misconduct") we m.ust concern
3
Insurance Code, § 11661: "An insurer shall not insure against the
liability of the employer for the additional compensation recoverable for
serious and wilful misconduct of the employer or his agent.''
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ourselves with its impact upon employes as well as upon
employcrf:l, it should be noted that, with certain statutory exeeptions, the r~egislature has seen fit to penalize employes
as well as employers for ''serious and wilful misconduct.''
''Where the injury is caused by the serious and wilful misc:onduct of the injured employee, the compensation otherwise
reeoverable therefor shall be reduced one-half . . . " ( § 4551).
[5] It eannot be seriously disputed that the words "serious
and wilful misconduct'' must be given the same meaning
in section 4551 as they have in section 4553. As has been
heretofore declared, ''There is no difference in principle between the degree of care required of an employer and that
exacted from an employee'' in determining whether serious
and wilful misconduct occurred (see Campbell, "Workmen's
Compensation," § 393, p. 363; E. Clernens Horst Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn. (1920), supra, 184 Cal. 180, 188; Parkh nrst v. Industrial Ace. Co1n. ( 1942), 20 Cal.2d 826, 831
[ 129 P .2d 113]). In other words, acts of the employer, to
constitute serious and wilful misconduct which would warrant increased compensation must be of no less moment, in
the relative circumstances, than the acts of an employe which
would warrant reduction of his normal eompensation. [6] In
determining, then, whether the managing superintendent of
petitioner was guilty of serious and wilful misconduct which
would justify increasing the award for other injured employes we must also consider that such misconduct, if the
same accident injured the superintendent, would require
reducing the normal award to him.
In order that the general principles of the law, which we
bereinafter undertake to state with such comprehensiveness
as appears practicable, may be clearly understood in their
application to this case, it seems desirable to first relate the
facts with considerable detail.
.
The prefabricated wooden structure here involved was
one of three units, A, B, and C, being constructed by petitioner for the Hammond Lumber Company. Hammond supplied the materials and hardware and prefabricated the
lumber, and petitioner supplied the construction "know-how"
and the men for the job. Each unit, when completed, was to
be approximately 500 feet long in a north-south direction and
192 feet wide. Units A and B, standing side by side, were up
and all of the bracing, except for the roof panels, was in.
The accident occurred during the construction of unit C,
which was situated to the north of, and adjacent to, unit A,
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and was to be attached to the latter unit (i.e., the south end
of C was to be attached by trusses to the north end of A)
to form one continuous building 1,000 feet in length. C was
not commenced as an extension of A; rather, petitioner began the erection of C at its most northerly end, raising and
extending columns and trusses in a southerly direction until
C reached the junction point with A.
Each unit was erected with 14-inch square timber columns
standing vertically on concrete footings. The columns were
spaced some 60 feet apart along the length of each unit and
63lj2 feet apart along the width, thus forming rectangular
areas (termed bays) throughout the unit. Prefabricated
wooden trusses, 60 feet long (designated as longitudinal or
wall trusses), were mounted on top of each pair of columns
along the length of the unit to ·span the space between
columns, and similar trusses, some 631!2 feet long (designated
as transverse or roof trusses), were mounted on top of each
pair of columns across the width of the unit.
According to the design of unit C, the framework when
completed would have had longitudinal knee braces connecting the several columns with the longitudinal trusses
each column supported. Also each column would have had
transverse knee braces and transverse sway braces connecting each column to the transverse trusses which it supported.
These braces were designed to give the structure support and
stability against the pressure of external forces.
The method of erecting the three units appears to have
been as follows : An initial bay or square (defined by the
four columns on its four corners) was erected, with each
of the four columns ''guyed'' to erection towers and also
" [ G] uy lines [were put] out, . . . cross lines . . . . Inside
and outside. . . . So it was braced in a square. . . . [I] t
would be crossed inside, criss-crossed, and also externally
outside"; longitudinal and transverse trusses were then set
on top of the columns; the initial bay was made the ''Anchor
block for the rest of the building blocks [or bays]," which
were not braced the same as the initial bay; in addition to
the guying and bracing of the initial bay, guy lines attached
to "deadmen" (objects serving as anchors buried in the
ground) were secured to columns along the external sides
of the structure.
On the day unit C collapsed all of its columns were up
except for two bays to be constructed at the northwest corner, and all trusses were in place except the longitudinal
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trusses which were to complete the connection between C
and A. Installation of the bracing required by the plans
and specifications had been commenced but only one set
of four sway braces attached to one column and the two
trusses it supported at the north end of C had been completely attached. A crew (including the injured employes
Walsh and Epping) working under foreman Hoffman were
installing a sway brace at the northern end of C and making
roof panels, and another crew (including the employes Soden
and McNabb) under foreman Hatten were installing the
longitudinal trusses connecting A and C. C collapsed over
its entire length and width.
R. B. Mcintosh, superintendent of maintenance and construction and chief engineer for Hammond (the company
for which petitioner, Mercer-Fraser, was constructing the
building), testified that he is an engineer by profession ;
that the plans and specifications for the buildings were drawn
by an architect and let out for bid by contractors, and that
petitioner was awarded the contract to build; on the job
site and on an unspecified date prior to collapse of C, the
witness, in the presence of Ernest Johnson (construction
supervisor for Hammond), told McFarlan (petitioner's construction superintendent) that "because of the type of construction I thought the building needed more guy lines at
that stage of construction. . . . I believe it was in connection with building 'C,' but the same would apply to all the
buildings because the type of construction was the same. . . .
[T] he gist of [McFarlan's reply] ... was that he considered the building stable enough to stand with the guy lines
as they were placed. . . . [H]is statement was to the effect
that the construction was good heavy construction and that
he thought it would stay up as it was being done, I don't
think that he specifically mentioned we had enough guy
wires, but he figured it was all right the way it was, that was
the gist of it'' ; ''guy lines in any construction are a form of
temporary brace to hold the construction in place until the
braces in the design or whatever might be designed into the
building to hold it stable are in place''; on the day of the
accident, just before the building collapsed about 1 p.m.,
there "was a pretty stiff wind, but nothing to evoke any great
comment as I remember, . . . from the northwest"; it is
"good construction practice to follow along in back of the
erection of columns and brace them as you're going along . . .
[including] not only guy lines but sway and transverse
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braces . . . [P] articularly on this building I would say it
was important . . . [T]he particular type of connection of
the trusses and columns was somewhat unusual"; my "conclusion was that . . . the collapse of the building was caused
by . . . a combination of the wind and the inadequacy of
bracing"; at the time of the hearing at which he was testifying (some two years after the accident) the buildings had been
completed ''and in the same manner as they were being built,
except . . . there was some additional [steel] bracing added
to the plans and incorporated in the buildings after the
[accident] . . . that bracing was in the walls and was not
included in the work that Mercer-Fraser was to do . . . [and]
was not planned until after the collapse of the building."
Ernest Johnson, construction supervisor and ''expediter of
material'' for Hammond, testified that he is not an engineer
by profession and had had no prior experience "in heavy
construction of this particular type . . . before the commencement of" unit A; his job in connection with the construction here involved was to look after Hammond's interests
and "see that the building was constructed as per drawings
and specifications"; he had no authority to instruct petitioner's employes ''as to the method they should use to erect''
the buildings, ''I could just offer my suggestions'' ; the method
of construction used was McFarlan's (petitioner's superintendent) ''own idea of how it should be done''; the manner of
erection and when the bracing was to be installed were left
to petitioner's discretion and were not shown on the plans
and specifications. About ''a week or ten days before the
accident" the witness and his supervisor, Mcintosh, discussed
the guy lines and the bracing on the three units with McFarlan; "we figured there should be more guy lines . . . McFarlan . . . thought there was enough . . . [W] e didn't
think there was enough bracing on it, that it may collapse'' ;
following this discussion nothing was ''done to change the
guy line situation'' although the witness did not know how
many guy lines were on unit C on the day it collapsed (after
the accident he saw some at the north end but recalled none
in the center of the unit); petitioner's employes started to
put more guy lines on units A and B "shortly after" C
collapsed ; the witness recalled no "objectionable features
concerning the construction" other than the discussion as to
the guy lines; units A and C were ''almost ·identical'' in construction and plan, the only difference was that C was ''slight-
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ly higher" than A; A and B did not collapse and were still
standing at the time of the hearing.
McNabb, one of the injured workmen, who was a carpenter
and a member of the ''erection crew'' under foreman Hatten,
testified that on the day of the accident, he and Soden (who
died from injuries received in the accident) were "working
on top of" unit C and were engaged in connecting units A
and C ; no one else was ''on the top'' ; before noon they had
installed one of the trusses connecting the two units; in so
doing they had discovered that the gap between A and C
"was two and a half inches longer than the truss" and "the
whole building, the 500-foot from the north had to be pulled
two and a half inches over to connect it"; the two workmen
"had put a chain block at the top of the truss" on C, and
"the post at the bottom" of C and "made this two and a half
inches pull to allow us to get our truss in''; after lunch McNabb anti Soden started to install another truss connecting
the next succeeding columns of A and C, but found the gap
this time was an inch and a half too short ; again using a chain
block the two workmen pulled unit C "back an inch and a
half to allow this truss to go in"; "about five to ten minutes"
later the building collapsed. McNabb further stated that on
the evening before the collapse he and Soden had "come down
off the roof [of C J that evening, and at that particular time,
there was nothing to hold it except just a box in the air, this
thing we conld feel it move, and so we . . . told him [foreman Hatten] at that time, in fact I told Mr. Hatten the next
day if something wasn't done I was going to stop, I wasn't
going- to work, and so he says, 'I think we can make her and
get her hooked up' "; later the same evening McNabb told
superintendent McFarlan that "If there ain't something
done to this building, it won't be here much longer," and
McFarlan said, "Oh I think it's very good, in very good condition, it's boxed up good and it's wide and the spans are
long, I think it will stand."
Harold McFarlan, who had been petitioner's construction
superintendent for 10 years, was the" general superintendent"
referred to in the commission's findings as being guilty of
serions and wilful misconduct. His competence and good
faith are unquestioned in the record unless we can infer that
they are negatived by the commission's conclusional finding
of serious and wilful misconduct. For reasons hereinafter
developed we think that such an inference is not reasonable
or tenable and that the commission does not, itself, draw it.
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Mr. McFarlan testified that he had been doing heavy construction work for some 40 years; that in this construction of unit
C the blueprints were followed, as well as good construction
practice and Safety Orders issued by the State of California;
that some 10 days before the accident there was a "high
wind" and "Mr. Mcintosh got worried about the building,
and so did I, and'' the witness thereupon made ''preparations
to overcome the deficiency in the bracing'' ; ''we certainly
didn't knowingly erect anything hazardous, we didn't ask men
to work in places if we thought it was dangerous, and I certainly wouldn't ask anybody to work under that building if
I thought it was going to fall down . . . I certainly wouldn't
have had my own son and all the other men working underneath that building"; on the day before the accident he was
told by the engineer and the oiler on a crane that some guy
lines were removed from unit C in order to permit moving
the crane, and he didn't know whether they were .replaced;
following the collapse of C additional bracing was installed in
units A and B; the "internal diagonal 'X' bracing" was not
placed on unit C ''identical to what it was on buildings'' A
and B for the reason that Hammond ''requested that we keep
the passageway open through that building so that the firefighting equipment could get in there in case of a fire,'' but
other guy lines placed on C were ''adequate to serve the purpose that the internal diagonal 'X' bracing would serve."
Harold B. Hamill, a consulting structural engineer, testified that in his opinion unit C collapsed "because it didn't
have proper . . . braces to resist forces from the west'' and
that he was referring to any type of brace ''the contractor
might have wanted to put on which would have resisted forces
from the west. They could have been guy lines from the outside . . . or the inside . . . [ T] here were none. It wouldn't
have fallen if there had been any.''
In support of the award respondents rely upon the familiar
rules (which petitioner does not challenge) that where the
evidence is in substantial conflict or is susceptible of conflicting inferences the finding of the commission, whether
for or against the applicant, is final and it is our duty to uphold such finding (California Shipbuilding Corp. v. I ndnstrial
Ace. Corn. (1946), 27 Cal.2d 536, 541-542 [165 P.2d 669]),
and that questions as to the weight of the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses are for the commission and if
there is any evidence, whether direct or by reasonable inference, which will support the commission's finding, the re-
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viewing court has no power to disturb it. (Nielsen v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1934), 220 Cal. 118, 122 [29 P.2d 852, 30
P.2d 995] .)
Respondents urge that the evidence is susceptible of the
inference that superintendent Mc]'arlan was guilty of serious
and wilful misconduct as more particularly specified in the
findings, hereinafter quoted or epitomized in some detail,
and in this connection cite various general provisions of the
Labor Code requiring the employer to maintain safe working
conditions. (See §§ 6310, 6311, 6400-6406.) 4 Petitioner contends that the evidence would support a finding of nothing
more culpable than a mistake in judgment or, at the most,
of negligence, by Mc:J:;'arlan on the critical question of adequacy of the guy lines and the bracing in unit C, and that
by a process of "hindsight" or "reverse reasoning" the commission has imposed upon petitioner the duty to absolutely
preserve the safety of its employes. The evidence does, of
course, support the conclusion that the collapse resulted from
inadequate guying and bracing. To decide intelligently the
controlling issues in these cases we must first understand
clearly the essentials for an award.
[7] Whether in any given case serious and wilful misconduct is shown, inherently presents questions of both fact
and law. Insofar as the issues may relate to the credibility
of witnesses, the persuasiveness or weight of the evidence and
the resolving of conflicting inferences, the questions are of
fact. But as to what minimum factual elements must be proven
in order to constitute serious and wilful misconduct, and the
sufficiency of the evidence to that end, the questions are of
law.
The courts of this state have frequently had occasion to discuss and to define the terms ''negligence,'' ''wilful misconduct,'' and ''serious and wilful misconduct,'' and to emphasize
the basic and substantial differences between negligence and
wilful misconduct. For guidance in stating comprehensively
the elements which must control the Industrial Accident
Commission and the courts in applying the pertinent statutes
•section 6310: " 'Safe' and 'safety' as applied to an employment
or a place of employment mean such freedom from danger to the life
or safety of employees as the nature of the employment reasonably
permits.''
Section 6311: '' 'Safety device' and 'safeguard' shall be given a broad
interpretation so as to include any practicable method of mitigating or
preventing a specific danger.''
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to the facts of particular cases we have reviewed the decisions
in all related types of cases which have come to our attention.
We bear in mind that the discussions and definitions in the respective cases ordinarily relate primarily to the term or terms
as used in the particular statute with which the court was
then concerned and that, for example, it is not necessarily true
that ''wilful misconduct'' under the automobile guest statute
(Veh. Code, § 403) has been unvaryingly reg·arded as being
precisely the same as ''serious and wilful misconduct'' under
the Labor Code ( § 4553.) But the discussions and definitions
evolved in cases considering these several statutes and related
statutes or common law principles are helpful in determining
what the Legislature must have meant in phrasing the statute
in question.
[8] Thus, in Donnelly v. Sonthern Pac. Co. (1941), 18 Cal.
2d 863 [ 118 P .2d 465], this court in defining what is meant by
"willful and wanton negligence" as that phrase has been
used by the federal courts, declared (pp. 869-870):
"Negligence is an unintentional tort, a failure to exercise
the degree· of care in a given situation that a reasonable man
under similar circumstances would exercise to protect others
from harm. (Rest. Torts, sees. 282, 283, 284; Prosser, Torts,
sees. 30 et seq.) [9] A negligent person has no desire to cause
the harm that results from his carelessness, (Rest. Torts, sec.
282 (c) ) , and he must be distinguished from a person guilty
of willful misconduct, such as assault and battery, who intends to cause harm. (Prosser, Torts, p. 261.) Willfulness and
negligence are contradictory terms. . . . [Citations.] If conduct is negligent, it is not willful; if it is willful, it is not
neglig·ent. It is frequently difficult, however, to characterize
conduct as willful or negligent. [10] A tort having some of the
characteristics of both negligence and willfulness occurs when
a person with no intent to cause harm intentionally performs
an act so unreasonable and dangerous that he knows, or
should know, it is highly probable that harm will result.
(Rest. Torts, sec. 500 et seq.; Prosser, Torts, pp. 260, 261.)
Such a tort has been labeled 'willful negligence,' 'wanton and
willful negligence,' 'wanton and willful misconduct,' and even
'gross negligence.' It is most accurately designated as wanton
and reckless misconduct. [11] It involves no intention, as does
willful misconduct, to do harm, and it differs from negligence
in that it does involve an intention to perform an act that
the actor knows, or should know, will very probably cause
harm. . . . [Citations.] Wanton and reckless misconduct is
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more closely akin to willful misconduct than to negligence,
and it has most of the legal consequences of willful misconduct.''
[12] And as appears from Porter v. Hofman (1938), 12
Cal.2d 445, 447-448 [85 P.2d 447] (a case involving the term
"wilful misconduct" as used in the so-called guest statute,
Veh. Code, § 403), and cases there cited, this court has approved the following definitions : ''Wilful misconduct . . .
necessarily involves deliberate, intentional, or wanton conduct in doing or omitting to perform acts, with knowledge or
appreciation of the fact, on the part of the culpable person,
that danger is likely to result therefrom."
"Wilfulness necessarily involves the performance of a deliberate or intentional act or omission regardless of the consequences.''
[13] " 'Wilful misconduct' means something different from
and more than negligence, however gross. The term 'serious
and wilful misconduct' is described . . . as being something
'much more than mere negligence, or even gross or culpable
negligence' and as involving 'conduct of a quasi criminal
nature, the intentional doing of something either with the
knowledge that it is likely to result in serious injury, or with
a wanton and reckless disregard of its possible consequences'
. . . The mere failure to perform a statutory duty is not,
alone, wilful misconduct. It amounts only to simple negligence. To constitute 'wilful misconduct' there must be actual
knowledge, or that which in the law is esteemed to be the
equivalent of actual knowledge, of the peril to be apprehended from the failure to act, coupled with a conscious
failure to act to the end of averting injury. . . . " Substantially the same principles are stated in Helme v. Great Western Milling Co. (1919), 43 Cal.App. 416, 421 [185 P. 510];
in James I. Barnes etc. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1944),
65 Cal.App.2d 249, 254 [150 P.2d 527] ; in Parsons v. FuUer
(1937), 8 Cal.2d 463, 468 [66 P.2d 430]; and in Cope v.
Davison (1947), 30 Cal.2d 193, 198 [180 P.2d 873, 171
A.L.R. 965]; see, also, North Pac. S. S. Co. v. Industrial Ace.
Com. (1917), 174 Cal. 500, 502 [163 P. 910]; Ethel D. Co.
v. I ndnstrial Ace. Corn. ( 1934), 219 Cal. 699, 704 [28 P.2d
919] ; Hargrave v. Ind11strial Ace. Com. (1940), 5 Cal. Comp.
Cases 129.
[14] In Meek V. Fowler (1935), 3 Cal.2d 420, 425-426 r45
P .2d 194] (a case also involving the so-called guest statute, and
quoting in part from Howard v. Howard (1933), 132 Cal.
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.A pp. 124, 128 [22 P .2d 279] [guest statute] ; see, also, Weber
v. Pinyan ( 1937), 9 Cal.2d 226, 230-235 [70 P .2d 183, 112
.A.L.R. 407] [guest statute]), the pertinent principles are
discussed as follows: "While the line between gross negligence and wilful misconduct may not always be easy to
draw, a distinction appears . . . in that gross negligence
is merely such a lack of care as may be presumed to indicate a passive and indifferent attitude toward results, while
wilful misconduct involves a more positive intent actually
to harm another or to do an act with a positive, active and
absolute disregard of its consequences. It seems clear that
in excluding all forms of negligence as a basis for recovery
in a guest case, the legislature must have intended that to
permit a recovery in such a case the thing done by a defendant must amount to misconduct as distinguished from negligence and that this misconduct must be wilful. While the
word 'wilful' implies an intent, the intention referred to
relates to the misconduct and not merely to the fact that
some act was intentionally done. In ordinary negligence,
and presumably more so in gross negligence, the element of
intent to do the act is present and any negligence might
be termed misconduct. But wilful misconduct as used in
this statute means neither the sort of misconduct involved
in any negligence nor the mere intent to do the act which
constitutes negligence. Wilful misconduct implies at least
the intentional doing of something either with a knowledge
that serious injury is a probable (as distinguished from a
possible) result, or the intentional doing of an act with a
wanton and reckless disregard of its possible result.
''Such intent and knowledge of probable injury may not
be inferred from the facts in every case showing an act or
omission constituting negligence for, if this were true, any
set of facts sufficient to sustain a finding of negligence would
likewise be sufficient to sustain a finding of wilful misconduct. .As has been repeatedly declared, ' "wilful misconduct'' means something more than negligence-more, even,
than gross negligence.' [Citations.] " [15] Manifestly, "serious and wilful misconduct'' cannot be established by showing acts any less culpable, any less deliberate, or any less
knowing or intentional, than is required to prove wilful
misconduct.
The situation here, which involved technical matters and
skilled, expert judgment, is quite obviously distinguishable
from the cases presented in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Industrial
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Ace. Com. (1944), 23 Cal.2d 659 [145 P.2d 583), Parkhurst
v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1942), supra, 20 Cal.2d 826, and
Blue Diamond Plaster Go. v. Indu,strial Ace. Com. (1922),
188 Cal. 403 [205 P. 678], in each of which it was found
that the employer had violated an express statute or safety
order framed to protect the employes. ( Gf. Simmons Go. v.
Industrial Ace. Com. (1945), 70 Cal.App.2d 664, 670 [161
P .2d 702].) Thus, in the Bethlehem Steel case, the employer
violated a specific safety order of the Industrial Accident Commission requiring that loads being transported by trucks
"shall be secured against displacement" ; in the Parkhurst
case the violation was of statutes and of specific orders of
health authorities relating to the purity of, and the methods
of supplying, drinking water to the employes; and in the
Blue Diamond case both ''general safety orders of the commission and . . . its express and repeated directions . . .
with relation to the safeguarding of the belts and pulleys
of the plant" were violated. By contrast, in the cases now
before us no such specific statute or safety order is involved,
but only expert judgment as to the extent of the guying and
bracing needed in the course of the particular construction
job here involved.
Some attempt has been made to isolate statements from
some of the above cited cases which might appear to support the view that any negligent act or omission could be
held to constitute serious and wilful misconduct. By way
of examples, the following sentences from the indicated cases
may be quoted: "The long continued maintenance of these
[dangerous] conditions was properly found to constitute
serious misconduct" (California Shipbuilding Gorp. v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1947), 31 Cal.2d 270, 273 [188 P.2d 27]);
"It has been held . . . that an employer's mistake in judgment does not relieve him from liability for serious and willful misconduct" (Parkhurst v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1942),
supra, 20 Cal.2d 826, 829-830, 831) ; ''The mere fact the
employer did not believe the condition was dangerous does
not relieve him from liability" (Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1944), s~tpra, 23 Cal.2d 659, 665).
The above quoted statements as used in their contexts and
applied respectively to the cases there under discussion correctly enunciate pertinent principles of law or propositions
of fact. But those statements cannot fairly be isolated and
understood to support the proposition that conduct which
both courts and legislative bodies have traditionally defined
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and considered to be mere negligence, however gross, may
be held by the Industrial Accident Commission to be serious
and wilful misconduct under the terms of workmen's compensation statutes. [16] Rather, the true rule i:s that serious
and wilful misconduct is basically the antithesis of negligence, and that the two types of behavior are mutually exclusive; an act which is merely negligent and consequently
devoid of either an intention to do harm or of knowledge
or appreciation of the fact that danger is likely to result
therefrom cannot at the same time constitute wilful misconduct; conversely an act deliberately done for the express purpose of injuring another, or intentionally performed either
with knowledge that serious injury is a probable result or
with a positive, active, wanton, reckless and absolute disregard of its possibly damaging consequences, cannot properly
be classed as the less culpable conduct which is termed negligence. [17] It follows that a finding of serious and wilful
misconduct cannot be sustained upon proof of mere negligence of any degree.
For the purposes of this opinion we assume without holding that the evidence as a matter of law is not insufficient
to support a finding that the employers' superintendent, McFarlan, was guilty of serious and wilful misconduct in deliberately, knowingly, and intentionally failing to sufficiently
brace and guy unit C so that it would not have collapsed
during the course of construction. As shown above, there
is testimony that he was warned on at least two or three
different occasions that in the opinions of others 5 the building needed additional bracing and was unstable and "won't
be here much longer . . . if something wasn't done'' ; that
it is good construction practice to brace the columns as they
are erected, including both permanent bracing (which had
not yet been installed when C collapsed) and temporary guying, and that such bracing "particularly on this building
. . . was important''; that some 10 days prior to the col.
lapse McFarlan himself became worried and made "preparations to overcome the deficiency in the bracing'' (the nature
of such preparations and whether they were actually carried
to execution, or whether McFarlan deliberately and wantonly refrained from carrying them into execution, does not
directly appear although the very fact that he was worried
•we intend no implication as to the weight, if any, which should be
accorded these opinions, or as to the qualification as experts of the
persons expressing them.
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would seem to
rather than affirm, either an intent
to harm or a wanton, positive and absolute disregard of possible harm) ; that on the day before the collapse McFarlan
was aware that guy lines had been removed to permit moving a crane, and he did not know whether they had been
and that the wind, on the day of the collapse,
stiff." \Ve particularly assume, for purposes
but without so holding, that such testimony
admits of the essential inference (we intend no implication
that it is
to that end or that as triers of fact
we should so find) that McFarlan was further aware that
unit C was so unstable as to constitute an imminent and
probable threat to the safety of the men working on it, and
that his failure to properly brace and guy the building went
beyond mere negligence and constituted an intentional omission of a criminal or quasi-criminal nature done either with
knowledge that serious or fatal injury was a probable result or with a positive, actiYe, absolute, reckless and wanton
disregard for the safety of tl1e workmen.
An award based on such a finding would be within the
law. Petitioner wonld not tl1ereby be required to guarantee
or preRerve ab:;;olntely the safety of its employes, or even
be free from negligence. as an alternative to suffering the
additional assessmf'nt provided for by the terms of section
4553: it would merely have to refrain from such deliberate,
knowing and intentional failure to take safety precautions,
whereby its employes were intentionally subjected to known,
serions. 1mnrces,sary and unreasonable hazards, as the Industrial Accident Commission. we arE' assuming, could have
inferred as above suggested. But petitioner's contention that
the commission did not make the subject awards on any such
view of either the facts or the law and that the findings on
tl1e issue of serious and wilful misconduct do not in truth
resolve the crucial issne and, l1ence, are inadequate and fail
to support the awarils, prrsents a quite differE>nt qnestion.
In eaeh of these cases the commission's findings on the
issue of serions and wilful misconduct are that (italics added
throughout) ''The employee was injured, in said employment,
by reaRon of the serious and wilful misconduct of the employer 1·n the nwnner more particularly as follows: . . . That
at, and immediately prior to, the time of injury . . . the
employer through its general superintendent, did knowingly
and wilfnll~r fail and neglect":
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[18a] (a) To "furnish employment, and a place of employment, which was safe for the work . . . " (As is shown subsequently, it appears that the commission in making this finding was of the view that the mere happening of the accident, coupled with a mistake in judgment on the part of
petitioner's superintendent, supports the finding and warrants the conclusion of serious and wilful misconduct on
the part of the superintendent.)
[19a] (b) To "furnish and use proper, sufficient and adequate safety devices and safeguards; to wit: the necessary and
required securing, bracing, and guying of the pre-fabricated
parts of a building, then being erected, so as to prevent the
fall or collapse thereof during the construction and thereby
render such employment, and construction, and place of
employment, and construction, safe for the work . . . " (This
finding seems to impute an absolute duty ''to prevent the
fall or collapse . . . during the construction,'' and it suggests the view that only by absolute prevention of collapse
can the employer avoid being held guilty of serious and wilful misconduct for failing to provide a safe place of employment.)
(c) To ''adopt and use those practices, means, methods,
and operations, in securing, bracing and guying the prefabricated parts of a building then being erected, so as to
prevent the fall or collapse during the construction thereof
and thereby render such employment, and construction, and
place of employment, and construction, safe for the work
" (Again, as in (b), this finding seems to impute an
absolute duty "to prevent the fall or collapse during the
construction,'' and a like absolute standard in respect to
the safety of the work.)
[20a] (d) To "do those things which a prudent employer
would have done, had it turned its mind to the fact, and which
were required to secure, brace, and guy the pre-fabricated
parts of a building, to protect the life, limb and safety of
the employees .
" (This finding obviously shows the view
that negligence and serious and wilful misconduct are synonymous.)
(e) To "use and to exercise that degree of prudence, foresight and caution which, under the circumstances, a prudent employer would then and there have used and exercised,
had it turned its mind to the fact, in requiring, permitting
and directing its employee . . . to go, work, and be, in employment, and construction, and place of employment, and
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construction, that was then and there unsafe." (This finding like (d), imputes no more than negligence as a basis for
the conclusion of serious and wilful misconduct.)
(f) To "use and to exercise that degree of prudence and
caution which, under the circumstances, a prudent employer
would then and there have used and exercised, had it turned
its mind to the fact, in requiring and directing its employees,
. . . to work upon, or in connection with, the erection of
prefabricated parts of a building, without first insuring and
securing proper, adequate, and necessary bracing and guying
so as to prevent the collapse of said structure during, and
in the course of, said erection and construction." (This
finding not only defines negligence to constitute serious and
wilful misconduct (as do (d) and (e)) but also appears to
construe as serious and wilful misconduct any failure to
insure absolute safety of the structure.)
[21a] (g) To ''comply with the requirements of Labor Code,
Sections 6400, 6401, 6402, and 6403, and each of them, neglecting, and omitting, to provide, secure, furnish and maintain, in place, and at the place of employment, necessary
and adequate bracing and guying of the pre-fabricated parts
of a building then being erected so as to prevent its fall or
collapse during, and in the course of, said construction. " 6
(This finding seems to presuppose that any failure for any
reason to install and maintain such guying and bracing as
would absolutely ''prevent'' the fall or collapse of the structure, would amount to a violation of the listed sections and
would constitute serious and wilful misconduct.)
[22] The primary rule of construing findings is to interpret them liberally in favor of sustaining the award, and
even if a finding, by itself, is inadequate for uncertainty it
"In contrast to the commission's findings and conclusions, the report
of the referee who conducted the hearings is as follows:
''If anybody would be charged with serious and wilful misconduct,
it would be on account of Mr. McFarlan's actions in not seeing to it
that better guy lines or more of them were put up. Having watched him
carefully at the hearing and considered his testimony in connection with
the entire record, I do not believe that anybody would question his good
faith or that he acted with full intentions of looking out for the safety
of his crew. The fact that he misjudged the stresses and strains on the
adequacy of the guy lines, if admitted, is not sufficient to charge the employer with serious and wilful misconduct.''
The referee then correctly states the law governing the conclusion
which should be drawn from the facts as he viewed them and concludes
with the statement that: ''The evidence is insufficient to establish that
the injury was caused by the serious and wilful misconduct of the employer."

124

MERCER-FRASER

Co. v.

INDUSTRIAL

Ace. Cmr.

[ 40 C.2d

will still be upheld if it can be made certain by reference
to the record. This court consistently has been liberal in
giving effect to such rule (see Vega Aircraft v. Industrial
Ace. Com. (1946), 27 Cal.2d 529, 535-536 [165 P.2d 665] ;
California Shipb7tilding Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1947),
supra, 31 Cal.2d 278, 279; Ethel D. Co. v. Industrial Ace.
Com. (1934), supra, 219 Cal. 699, 708) and it does not now
recede from it. But here the problem is not answered by
that rule. Basic justice and common honesty require that
the commission and this court be fair to both the employe
and the employer. The factual elements which, by the statutory requirement, must be found to exist before an award
for serious and wilful misconduct can be sustained are hereinabove declared. The critical question here is: On the
whole record can we fairly hold that the commission has
found the essential facts to exist? Or, does it appear, rather,
that to facts not meeting the legal minimums the commission has applied a standard stricter than that authorized
by the Legislature?
After most careful scrutiny of the entire record we conclude that the findings here lead to perplexity which cannot
be cured by reference to the record and that on any reasonable construction such findings do not fairly support the
awards. [23a] Although, as indicated above, it is not required that findings be specific and detailed it is essential
that they be sufficient in form and substance so that by reading them and referring to the record the parties can tell
and this court can tell with reasonable certainty not only
the theory upon which the commission has arrived at its ultimate finding and conclusion but that the commission has
in truth found those facts which as a matter of law are
essential to sustain its award.
[20b] It is obvious, as indicated above, that certain of
the specifications of ''fact'' contained in the findings are
wholly insufficient, in that they include matters which on
any view whatsoever are significant of nothing more culpable
than negligence, as for example, in paragraph (e) of the
quoted findings (see, also, paragraphs (f) and (d)), that
the employer, through its general superintendent, failed and
neglected to ''exercise that degree of prudence, foresight
and caution which, under the circumstances, a prudent employer would then and there have'' exercised, and so was
guilty of serious and wilful misconduct. Such statements
concerning what a "prudent employer" would have done

Jan.1953]

MERCER-FRASER

Co. v.

INDUSTRIAl"

Ace. CoM. 125

[40 C.2d 102; 251 P.2d 955]

''had it turned its mind to the fact'' obviously do not establish serious and wilful misconduct, which, as has been shown,
requires an act or omission to which the employer has ''turned
its mind.''
as also above suggested, such statements
indicate that the commission has held acts and omissions
to no more than negligence, to constitute serious
and vvilful misconduct. Yet, as previously shown, negligence
and wilful misconduct are inherently incompatible. The
quoted
of fact, disregarding the ultimate conclusion of serious and wilful misconduct, do not in any respect determine that the employer here, through its general
superintendent, was guiJty of more than negligence. Such
findings do not with any reasonable certainty determine
any facts from which this court can conclude that the petitioner was guilty of serious and wilful misconduct or that,
in truth, the commission itself has found facts which warrant
such ulitimate conclusion.
'fhc
made do not determine that the general
superintC'ndent had knowledge that if be failed to add
further guying and bracing a probable result would be the
collapse of the building, nor can this court determine that
the commission found as a fact that such superintendent did
in truth know' or believe that the guying and bracing was
insufficient and that a possible result would be the collapse
and the serious injury of employes and with that knowledge
proceeded with reckless, absolute, positive and wanton disregard of thr consequenrefl. Rather, the commission's findings,
in
((!), (e), and (f), on the issne of serious and
wilfnl mif'condnct demonstrate that the commission has regarded as snch seri01lS and wilful misconduct acts and omissions 'ivhieh as a matter of law do not com;titute such miscon(hwt. lmt merely evidence neglig·ence, [18b, 19b, 21b] and
as to
), (b) (c), and (g) it appears that the commission has gone even farther than to hold that negligence is
serions and wilful misconduct; it seems to have held petitionrr to the standard of an insurer.
can be said that the findings, or any of
and that thrir langmtge might admit
which wonld snstain the awards npon
stanflards which we havr enmH~iated, we are satisfied
thr rreon1 here precludes intrrpretation to that end.
cannot here fairly be resolved in favor
the awards because reference to the record and
to the commission's formally declared position (its own Ian-
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guage is hereinafter quoted) seems to demonstrate that the
commisson did not in truth find, and does not believe, that
all the essentials of wilful and serious misconduct have been
proven.
[24] The commission argues that the findings establish
serious and wilful misconduct since they state the ultimate
conclusion of such misconduct. However, such findings do not
specify any facts from which this court can conclude that
the basic and essential factual elements, which it is hereinbefore shown are necessary to support the ultimate conclusion
of serious and wilful misconduct, were found to exist. Instead,
such findings indicate that, as urged by petitioner, the commission was holding petitioner to the standard of an insurer
or guarantor of the safety of its employes, rather than applying to the issue of serious and wilful misconduct the legally
essential elements which we have specified in detail hereinabove. [19c] Thus, in the quoted paragraphs (as more
specifically identified above), the words employed by the
commission indicate the view that petitioner had an absolute,
or substantially an absolute, duty and responsibility to make
and keep the employment conditions safe against all hazards
and to absolutely prevent (at least, as hereinafter noted from
the argument of the commission, "In the absence of circumstances which could not be foreseen,'' as, for example, an act
of God) the collapse of the building here involved, and that
any failure to meet that standard, whether due to negligence
or otherwise, constituted serious and wilful misconduct.
Furthermore, the argument made by the commission itself
in its answers to the petitions for the writ conclusively establishes that in fairness to the petitioner this court cannot interpret the conclusional findings as being an actual determination of the essential facts. For example, it is declared in such
answers that ''An employer's failure to comply with the requirements of Labor Code, Sections 6400 through 6403 [dealing with an employer's duty to maintain safe working conditions], constitutes serious and wilful misconduct . . . In
the absence of extraordinary circumstances which could not
[apparently meaning in the exercise of the highest degree of
care and capability] be foreseen, petitioner was under a duty
to employ methods and practices in the erection of the building to 1"nsure that it would not collapse from the pressure of
forces to which it might be subjected during the construction
period. Petitioner's failure to take adeqtwte precautions
against the dangers inherent in the erection of the structure
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clearly constitutes seriotts and wilful misconduct . . . McFarlan 's failure to provide additional bracing was predicated
on his belief that his method of construction and the guying
provided was adequate to sustain the structure." (Italics
added.)
[18c] It is manifest from what has been said that if McFarlan in good faith believed (and the commission says he did
believe) that the method of construction being employed was
sound anfl sufficient for the safety of all concerned then he
was guilty of no more than a mistake in judgment. His mistake in judgment on a technical matter of construction practice is his only "misconduct." In the light of these circumstances and the commission's statement, it seems unthinkable
that the commission actually intended to hold, or has held,
that McFarlan was guilty of serious and wilful misconduct
within the true meaning of that term as defined hereinabove;
a meaning, as already pointed out, which would require that
if he had been injured in the building collapse, the normal
award to him would have to be reduced. There is no suggestion that McFarlan was incompetent or inexperienced or that
his employer (the petitioner) was itself guilty of misconduct
in employing McFarlan for the job at hand. Under the circumstances here appearing, annulment of the awards is compelled.
[25] .As previously indicated, in each of the four cases
the individual respondent has filed a "Special .Appearance in
Answer to'' the petition for the writ and for hearing in this
court, in which it is urged that the court is without jurisdiction to consider such petition by reason of the failure of
the petitioner to serve a copy of the petition :for the writ upon
the individual respondent either prior to filing such petition
or within the 30-day period specified by section 5950 7 during
which the petition may be filed. On the date (.April 13, 1951)
of filing of the petitions for review the Rules on .Appeal provided, in rule 57, that "(a) .A petition to review an order or
award of the Industrial .Accident Commission shall be accompanied by proof of service of 2 copies thereof on the In7
Section 5950, at the times here involved, provided: "Within thirty
days after the petition for a rehearing is denied, or, if the petition is
granted, within thirty days after the rendition of the decision on the
rehearing, any person affected thereby may apply to the supreme court
or to the district court of appeal of the appellate district in which he
resides, for a writ of review, for the purpose of inquiring into and
determining the lawfulness of the original order, decision, or award,
or of the order, decision, or award on rehearing.''
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dustrial Accident Commission . . . , '' and petitioner complied
with this rule. A copy of the petition was not, however,
served upon the individual respondents or their attorneys
until July 20, 1951, and the respondents contend that this
failure to comply earlier with the provisions of section 5954 8
precludes our consideration of the petition.
Counsel for petitioner state that the delay in serving respondents' attorneys resulted from their complete reliance
upon the Rules on Appeal, and that they inadvertently overlooked the service provisions of section 5954 until after the
filing of the "Special Appearance" of each individual respondent. 9 vV e are not disposed, however, to accept the view
that such service provisions can properly be interpreted as
excluding jurisdiction under the circumstances shown here.
It is to be noted that no time limitations appear in section
5954. In section 5905 the Legislature has directed that a copy
of a petition to the commission for reconsideration ("rehearing" prior to 1951 amendment) of an award be served "forthwith" (apparently after filing, see §§ 5903, 5904) upon all
adverse parties, and if a definite time limit was intended to
apply to service of a copy of a petition for a writ of review
it could easily have been included in section 5954.
Respondents rely upon statements that ''The right to be
present at any hearing necessarily includes the right to have
notice of such hearing in time to attend" ( Car·stens v. Pillsbury ( 1916), 172 Cal. 572, 577 [ 158 P. 218] ) , and that "'l'he
real adverse party in interest [in a certiorari proceeding]
. . . is the one in whose favor the act complained of has been
done" (Lee v. Small Claims CmiTt (1939), 34 Cal.App.2d 1,
5 [92 P.2d 937]), and also upon the holding in Lyydikainen
v. Industr-ial Ace. Com. (1939), 36 Cal.App.2d 298 [97 P.2d
993], annulling an order of the commission where failure to
8
Section 5954 provides: ''The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
relating to writs of review shall, so far as applicable, apply to proceedings in the courts under the provisions of this article [the article concerning judicial review of commission awards]. A copy of every pleading filed pursuant to the terms of this article shall be served on the
commission and upon every party who entered an appearance in the
action before the Industrial Accident Commission and whose interest
therein is adverse to the party filing such pleading.''
"Rule 57, Rules on Appeal (as amended effective November 13, 1951)
now provides ''(a) A petition to review an order or award of the Industrial Accident Commission shall be accompanied by proof of service
of 2 copies thereof on the Industrial Accident Commission and one copy
upon each party who entered an appearance in the action before the Industrial Accident Commission and whose interest therein is adverse to
the party filing the petition. . . . ' '
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(•.omply with statntory provision:,; for service of a petition for

an order termillating liability resulted in an award terminatemnpem;ation payments to an injured employe without an
opportunity tn the employe to be heard. In the present
cases, however, the individual respondents have not been
denied notice or opportunity to be heard and to file answers
to the petitions for writs of review; on the contrary they
admit being served on June 16, 1951, with copies of the
amrwers (on the merits) filed by the commission to the petitions for the writ and on July 20, 1951, with copies of the
petitions for the ·writ. [26] Moreover, as observed by the
(:ourt in Pete1· v. Board of SuperV?:sors (1947), 78 Cal.App.
2d 515, 521 [178 P.2d 73], '"l'he requirements as to service
when the petition [for the issuance of any prerogative writ,
including certiorari] is filed, in section 1107 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, wonld seem to be more directory than mandatory as the c:ourt may act on the petition without any service if it decides to do so. Under these circumstances it would
seem that service might be made after the petition is filed
if the court should decline to proceed in the matter without
service. 'fhe proYisions as to service and points and authorities in opposition to the issuance of a writ under the prayer
of a petition would seem to be more for the benefit of the court
than for the advantage of the parties.'' (See, also, Code Civ.
Proc., § 1069.) We believe the same observation is appropriate
with reference to the serviee provisions of section 0954 of the
Labor Code, and hold respondents' contentions on this point
to be without merit.
For the reasons above stated, the subjeet awards are
auunlled.
Uibson, C. ,J., Edmonds, J., 'rraynor, J., Spence, J., and
IV ood (Parker), ,J. pro tern., concurred.
CAH'l'EH, J.-I dissent. 'rbe majority opinion in this case
is a definite departure from what has been considered the
settled law of this state in industrial accident cases, namely,
that where specific findings of fact are snpported by substantial evidence, an award based thereon will be affirmed.
Here the commission found, on evidence assumed by the majority to be sufficient to support such findings, that petitioner
h:novvingly and wilfully failed:
(a) 'l'o furnish employment, and a place of employment,
which was safe for the work.
40 C.2d--5
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(b) To fnruish and usc proper, sufficient and adequate
safety devices and safeguards; to wit: the necessary and retjuired seen ring, bracing, and guying of the prefabricated
parts of a building, then being erected, so as to prevent the
fall or collapse thereof during the construction and thereby
render such employment, and construction, and place of employment safe for the work.
(c) 'l'o adopt and use those practices, means, methods, and
operations, in seeuring, bracing and guying the prefabricated
parts of a building then being erected, so as to prevent the
fall or collapse during the construdion thereof and thereby
render such employment, and construction, and place of employment safe for the work.
( cl) To do those things which a prudent employer would
haYe done, had it turned its mind to the fact, and which
were required to secure, brace, and guy the prefabricated
parts of a bnilding, to protect the life, limb and safety of the
employees.
(e) To use and to exercise that degree of prudence, foresight and caution which, under the circumstances, a prudent
employer ·would then and there have used and exercised, had
.it turned its mind to the fact, in requiring, permitting and
directing its employees to go, work, and be, in employment,
and construction, and place of employment, that was then
and there unsafe.
(f) To use and to exercise that degree of prudence and
eaution which, under the circumstances, a prudent employer
would then and there have used and exercised, had it turned
its mind to the faet, in requiring and directing its employees,
to work npon, or in connection with, the erection of prefabricated parts of a building, without first insuring and securing
proper, adequate, and necessary bracing and guying so as
to prevent the collapse of said structure during, and in the
co1Jrse of, said erection and construction.
(g) 'fo comply with the requirements of Labor Code, sections 6400, 6401, 6402, and 6403, and each of them, neglecting,
and omitting, to provide, secure, furnish and maintain, in
place, and at the place of employment, necessary and adequate bracing and guying of the prefabricated parts of a
building then being erected so as to prevent its fall or collapse
during, and in the course of, said construction.
1'he majority assumes that the evidence is sufficient to •
support such findings, but nevertheless annuls the award beeause it interprets these findings as supporting a conclusion

,Jan. l95:3J

MERCim-]'RASER

Co. v.

lNDURTRIAr;

Ace. CoM. 1:11

[40 C.2d 102; 251 P.2d 955]

that petitioner was guilty of negligence only. By what legerdemain may it be said that an employer who is found guilty 6f
serious and wilful misconduct because he knowingly and wilfully failed to provide a safe place for his employees to work,
is guilty of negligence only? The answer to this question
contained in the majority opinion is based upon a process of
reasoning out of barmony with the social philosophy which
postulated the statutory provisions here involved and renders
them ineffective. This philosophy stems from the basic eoncept that industry should bear the burden of injuries suffered
hy working men and women in the course of their employment, and since the employer could insure against injuries
resulting from negligence it was necessary, in order to force
employers to comply with safety regulations and provide safe
places of employment, that they be subjected to increased
awards to thoRe injured as the result of their wilful failure
to so comply. This philosophy is embodied in our statutes,
and cases arising thereunder ·which have come to this court
for review indieate judicious consideration by the Industrial
,\cci<1ent Commission. The ease at bar is no exception.
Brushing aside the sophistry with which the majority
opinion is repletr, what are the realities of the situation here
presented'! They clearly show the evidence was suffieient.
A building collapsed in the course of construction and four
nwn working thereon were seriously injured-two of them
fatally. It is admitted that the cause of the eollapse was
iusnfficient bracing-that this condition was called to the
attention of the: employer's superintendent and he did nothing
to correct it although he had ample time and the means to
do so. In otber words the building was unsafe because it
was not sufficiently braced and the employer knew that it wafl
therefore highly dangerous-a danger that would inevitably
result in serim1s injuries and death. Yet with that lmowledge
he put the workmen on the job. Certainly if an employer
knows a place of work is fraught with grave danger but still
ecnnpelr-; his employees to face that danger, he evinces a reekle!'>s disregard of the safety of his employees. \Vhateyer may
have lwen the motives for his eonduet, to save money, or
time or to c;atisfy a sadistic impulse is not important. The
wenk ex(~l!Se of thr• superintem1ent that he thought the building lmd (~fHJttg·h bra('ing eannot r'hange the result. 'l'he commission could diRbelievr' his testimony as to what he thought
and conclude that, he had full knowledge that the building
was in an nnsafe eondition. On this evidfmce, the commi.s-
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sion found that the employer knowingly and wilfully failed
to provide a safe place of employment for the men who were
injured and that such failure constituted serious and wilful
mi:sconduct. I do not see how the commission could have
found otherwise. But the majority of the court seems to
be more concerned with technical terms and phraseology than
the liberal application of the law enacted for the protection
of working men and women who have suffered loss of life
and serious injuries as the result of its violation. In fact,
the whole tenor of the majority opinion is to emphasize the
burden placed on the employer by this legislation and minimize its salutary objective. It is the age-old reactionary concept of property rights above human welfare: 'What does it
matter that working men and women are killed and injured
because industrial enterprises are unsafe so long as employers can escape liability? To guard against injury to employees may cost the employer money, so why should he do
so without compulsion? The answer is that experience has
shown that some employers will not provide safety devices
unless forced to do so, hence the remedial legislation here involved-that life and limb of employees be protected against
unnecessary risks even if it costs the employer money to do
so. Not only has the Legislature spoken by creating the liability of increased awards where serious and wilful miseonduet is involved, but it has declared it to be the duty of
the e<1nrts to liberally construe the provisions of the act "with
the purpose of extending their benefits for the protection of
persons ·inj1.wecl in the course of their employment.'' (Emphasis added.) (Lab. Code, § 3202.) This legislation has been
generally accepted as extending to working men and women
a measure of the economic and social justice to which people
in industrial employment are entitled. Thinking people
agree that social progress means, generally speaking, the
gradual advaneement of human welfare toward greater
physic:1l. moral and eultural enjoyment of life. The legislation here involved tends toward this objective and should
he liberally construed to achieve it. The present decision
finds no parallel in the annals of the judicial history of this
state in its antithesis of liberal construction with respect to
both the act here involved and the proceedings before the
Industrial Accident Commission and this court.
The majority opinion assumes that there was sufficient
evidence to support a finding of serious and wilful misconduct
on the part of the employer and therefo~e increased benefits
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eonld be properly awarded against it under section 4553 of
1he

!Jaboe
but it annuls the award on the grounds that
the findings are uot ~'>ufficient to support the award; that they
are based upon the tl1eory that negligence constitutes wilful
misconduct and that all that was found was negligence.
'l'he rnain contention made by the petitioner here is that
t hP evidence is insufficient to support a finding of serious
aml wilful misconduct, yet the ma;jority refuses to pass upon
that question. (lt is a matter r will discuss later herein.)
'l'hat refusal violates the policy expressed by statutes dealing
with decisions on appeal that where a new trial is granted
the court shall ''pass upon and determine all questions of law
involved in the case, presented upon such appeal, and necessary to the final determination of the case.'' (Code Civ.
Proe., §53.) It is especially pertinent here for when the
•·ase goes back to the commission all it needs to do is to amend
its findings. Petitioner will again seek a review of the case
mging its main point that the evidence is insufficient. If the
court decides it is insufficient then the case can be retried
with additional evidence and another review sought. Such
<lelays are inexcusable and should not be countenanced.
The findings are clearly sufficient. 'l'hey read that the
employee was injured by reason of the "serious and wilful
misconduct" of the employer "in the manner and more particularly as follows.'' Then follow various particular findings. \Ve need go no further under the law than the findings of serious and wilful misconduct ; the particular findings
may be ignored. A finding of serious and wilful misconduct in those words-the words of the statute (Lab. Code,
§ 4553)-is sufficient. (California Shipbuilding Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 31 Cal.2d 270 [188 P.2d 27) ; Kaiser
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 81 Cal.App.2d 818 [185 P.2d
353] ; General Petroleum Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 90
Cal.App. 101 [265 P. 508] ; Clarke v. Industrial Ace. Corn.,
87 Cal.App. 766 [262 P. 471]; Dawson v. Industrial Ace.
Corn., 54 Cal.App.2d 594 [129 P.2d 479]; Vega Aircraft
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 27 Cal.2d 529 [165 P.2d 665] ;
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 29 Cal.
2d 492 [175 P.2d 823]; Ethel D. Co. v. Indust1·ial Ace. Com.,
219 Cal. 699 [ 28 P .2d 919].) It is equally clear that a
court will not annul an award if the findings are inconsistent.
Tf there are findings which will sustain the award other findings which would annul it are not available for that purpose. (George L. Eastman Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 186
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Cal. 587 [200 P. 17] ; 8m~thern Pac. Co. v. Industrial Ace.
Corn., 177 Cal. 37R r110 P. i\22]; Coombs v. Industrial Ace.
Com._, 76 C<1l.A pp. 565 i 245 P. 445] ; Hines v. Industrial Ace.
Corn., 215 Cal. 177 [8 P.2d 1021] .) It necessarily follows
that the majority holding which annuls the award by relying upon findings other than the ultimate one of serious
and wilful misconduct is squarely contrary to the foregoing
authorities. Yet none of them is even discussed. If it is
the intention of the majority to overrule those cases it should
be done openly and frankly. Moreover the statutory required liberal construction of the workmen's compensation
laws (Lab. Code, § 3202) demands that the findings be liberally construed to support the award.
Tn addition to the finding·s of the ultimate fact of wilful
misconduct, the commission expressly found the existence
of wilful misconduct in detail. After making the ultimate
finding, it is said that the misconduct occurred particularly
as follows: That at and prior to the time of the collapse
the employer "did knowingly and wilfully fail"; then follow seven separate paragraphs (a to g) specifying what the
employer wilfully and knowingly failed to do or did, such
as to furnish a safe place for the employee to work, to furnish and use proper safety devices, namely, bracing and
guying for the structure so as to prevent its collapse. That
such findings are adequate is beyond doubt. If an employer
knowingly and wilfnlly fails to furnish a safe place for the
employee to work (a safe place of employment is required
by the safety laws of this state*) or to furnish supports to
prevent a certain building from collapsing and injuring
and killing workmen, we have the clearest case of Rerious
and wilful misconduct that could be imagined.
The majority opinion cannot be reconciled with numerous
eaRes. In Parkhurst v. Indttstrial Ace. Corn., 20 Cal.2d 826
f12!) P.2d 1131, this court annulled a commisRion finding
of no wilful misconduct stating: "It has been held repeatedly
*''Every employer shall furnish employment and n place of employment which are s3fe for the employees therein.'' (Lab. Code, ~ 6400.)
''Every employer shall furnish and use safety deviees and safeg-uards,
and shall adopt and use practices, means, methods, operations, and processes, which are reasonably adequate to render such employment and
plac-e of employment safe. Every employer shall do every other thing
reasonably necessary to protect the life and safety of employees.'' (Lab.
Code, § 6401.) " 'Safe' and 'safety' as applied to an employment or a
place of employment mean such freedom from danger to the life or
safety of employees as the nature of the employment reasonably
permits." (Lab. Code, ~ 6310.)
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that the employment of workmen under dangerous conditions that can be guarded against constitutes a reckless disregard for their safety. (Emphasis added.) (Hatheway
v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, [13 Cal.2d 377 (90 P.2d 68)];
Hoffman v. Department of Indus. Relations, supra, [209 Cal.
383 (287 P. 974, 68 A.L.R. 294)] ; Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Ace. Com., sttpra, [209 Cal. 412 (288 P. 66)] ;
Gordon v. Industrial Ace. Corn., supra; Blue Diamond Plaster Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, [188 Cal. 403 (205 P.
678)] ; Johannsen v. Industrial Ace. Com., 113 Cal.App. 162
[298 P. 99] .) " In Hatheway v. Inclustrial Ace. Com., 18
Cal.2d 377, 380 [ 90 P .2d 68], the principles are stated and
eases discussed : ''It has frequently been said that wilful
misconduct involves the knowledge of the person that the
thing whieh he is doing is wrong. . . . Conceding that knowledge is required, it seems to us that in order to prove the
requisite knowledge, it is not necessary for the evidence to
show positively that the person was notified of the unsafe
condition of his premises, but that it is sufficient if it appears that the circumstances surrounding the act of commission or omission are such as 'evince a reckless disregard for the safety of others and a willingness to inflict
the injury complained of.' "
''The cases are quite uniform to the effect that permitting employees to work under dangerous conditions which
are capable of being guarded against, constitutes such a
reckless disregard for the safety of the employees that the
Commission's finding that such conduct is serious and wilful
will not be disturbed. The mere fact the employer did not
believe the condition was dangerous does not relieve him
from liability. 'l'hus in Blue Diamond Plaster Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 188 Cal. 403, 409 [205 P. 678], the employee was killed as a result of the failure of the employer
to place guards on machinery. The managing agents of
the employer testified that they knew of the condition, but
stated that they did not consider the condition unsafe. 'Their
mistake in judgment upon that subject cannot be held to
relieve their employer from liability.' An award based on
serious and wilful misconduct was affirmed. In Hoffman
v. Department of Industrial Relations, 209 Cal. 383 [287
P. 974, 68 A.L.R. 294], it was held that where the employer
violated the terms of a statute providing· for a specified type
of temporary flooring and its method of construction to
be used when erecting a building, he was guilty of serious
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and wilful misconduct, even though the employer was ignorant of the provisions of the statute. In Pa,e;ific Emp.
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 209 Cal. 412 [288 P. 66],
the employee was injured by an unguarded saw. The employer was held guilty of serious and wilful misconduct although the saw had been in operation but a week, and the
employer testified that he intended to place a guard thereon.
In Gordon v. Industrial Ace. Com., 199 Cal. 420 [249 P.
849, 58 A.L.R. 1374], the employee was killed in a cave-in
of a gravel pit. It was held that compelling an employee
to work in a dangerous spot, without taking protective
measures, where the employer knows or should have known
of the danger is serious and wilful misconduct. In holding
an employer guilty of serious and wilful misconduct under
somewhat similar circumstances the appellate court in Johannsen v. Industrial Ace. Com., 113 Cal.App. 162, 166 [298 P.
99], stated: 'Had he (the employer) turned his mind to a
consideration of the subject he must have known that a
person working in the trench was in jeopardy, which danger could readily have been obviated by the necessary bracing.'''
While the above cited cases differ factually from the case
at bar the philosophy and legal concept of those cases is
equally applicable here. The dangerous character of the
place where the employees were required to work was obvious, If it was not known it was of such a character that
it should have been known. Steps could easily have been
taken to alleviate the danger but the employer did nothing
whatsoever and sent the employees on that dangerous mission with reckless disregard of their safety.
To evade the specific provisions of the findings that the
acts causing the collapse of the building were wilfully and
knowingly done and hence wilful misconduct, the majority
uses various devices. It ignores the express findings that
the various things done or omitted and listed in paragraphs
a to g are all qualified by the phrase preceding those paragraphs that the failure was wilful and knowing.
It discusses those paragraphs which appear to speak of
negligence, failing, however, to stress the ones which do
not point to negligence such as that the employer wilfully
and knowingly failed to supply guy wires and braces for
the structure. The findings pointing toward negligence should
be disregarded under the authorities heretofore cited holding that such is the rule Vl>ith regard to commission findings
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and the rule which demands liberal construction of the findings. Even on appeal where findings of a court are reviewed,
the rule is : ''An appellate court will construe findings liberally in support of the judgment. Any uncertainties will
be construed so as to uphold rather than defeat the judgment, that is, to give it effect rather than destroy it. All
the findings are to be read together, and must be reconciled
to prevent any conflict on material points, if possible. Even
if there is only one clear, sustained, and suffim:ent finding
upon wh1:ch a judgrnent may rest, it will be presumed that
the cmwt did rest the judgment on that finding.
''In reviewing the sufficiency of findings to support a
judgment, the appellate court will regard the ultimate facts
found and not mere probative facts, unless the trial court's
findings slww that the probative facts are the only £acts
proved and that they alone are the basis for its finding of
the ultimate facts. In the absence of such a showing, the
mere circumstance that some of the probative facts are inconsistent with the ultimate facts will not prevent the ultimate £acts from controlling. And whenever the facts found
are such as might authorize different inferences, it will be
presumed that the inference made by the trial court was
one that will uphold rather than defeat the judgment. In
such a case the appellate court will not draw any inference
contrary to that which might have been dravm by the trial
court for the purpose of rendering its judgment." ( 4 Cal.
Jur.2d Appeal and Error, § 571.) (Emphasis added.)
The majority states that the theory of law adopted by the
commission in its findings and award was erroneous. That,
however, ignores the rule that : "It is, of course, immaterial
that the theory upon which the judgment may be affirmed
is not identical with that relied upon by plaintiffs or by
the trial court, since plaintiffs are required only to plead
and prove facts sufficient to justify relief, and the trial
court's judgment must be affirmed if the findings, supported
by the evidence, are sufficient to warrant the relief granted
on any legal theory." (Sears v. Rule, 27 Cal.2d 131, 140
[163 P.2d 443]; 4 Cal.Jnr.2d, Appeal and Error, § 536.)
There is ample here in the evidence and findings to support the theory that wilful misconduct is more than negligence and is what the majority opinion describes it to be.
Other things stated in the majority opinion, although dictum, require comment. It is said that the increased award
for wilful misconduct is a penalty and hence such an award
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can be sustained only if the commission finds every fact
essential to its imposition. In the first place the additional
compensation is not a penalty. That was held in E. CLemens
Horst Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 184 Cal. 180 [193 P.
105, 16 .A.L.R. 611], where the court held the provision for
increased compensation was not even exemplary damages
and hence was constitutional. That holding is based upon
the obvious truth that ordinary compensation does not fully
cover the loss suffered by the employee. (E. Clemens Horst
Co. v. Industr·ial Ace. Com., supra, 184 Cal. 180; Western
lnde1nnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686 [151 P. 398]; West
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 79 Cal..App.2d 711 [180 P.2d 972].)
Secondly, that statement is contrary to the above discussed
rules that only ultimate facts need be found and findings
must be liberally construed. In this same connection the
statement that conduct any less culpable than wilful misconduct would be an ''unlawful taking of the property of
one person and unwarranted giving it to another'' is also
incorrect for the same reasons.
The majority opinion brushes aside such cases as Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. Industria.l Ace. Com., 23 Cal.2d 659 [145 P.2d
583] and Parklwrst v. Industrial Ace. Com., 20 Cal.2d 826
[129 P.2d 113], holding wilful misconduct was present where
a safety order was violated with the comment that in the
ease at bar expert judgment was involved in guying the
structure and no safety order was involved. Just as much
expert judgment was involved and the safety order was substantially the same in those cases. Here we have the safety
statutes and in the Bethlehem case the safety requirement
was that loads transported by trucks be secured against displacement. The safety statute here requires that the structure
be safe, that is, secured against collapsing by sufficient guy
wires or bracing. This the employer knew but wilfully disregarded. Such disregard constituted serious and wilful
misconduct.
I would therefore affirm the awards here made.
l(espondents' petition for a rehearing was denied February
2, 1953. Carter, .T., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted. Shenk, .T., did not participate therein.

